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1 Introduction
When the bank of Thailand floated the baht on
2 July 1997 – and saw its value fall by more than half
in eight months, the world naturally thought of it as
primarily a currency crisis. But it is the massive failure
of the financial system, the other half of the twin
crises, that had a more profound impact and which
wrought significant institutional changes to the
economic system of the country.
The story of the events that led to the denouement
of 2 July 1997 is well known, so we need merely to
cover it in one short paragraph.1 Beginning in 1990
but accelerating in 1993, the Bank of Thailand
engaged in a series of moves to liberalise the capital
account. The control on foreign inward movements
of capital was removed, and foreign lenders were
allowed to lend money to Thai financial institutions
and to Thai corporations in a regime with fixed
exchange rates. Given the strength of the Thai
economy prevailing in the early 1990s, these lenders
found that lending to Thai companies and banks was
quite profitable and carried little risk. As the
economy heated up during the bubble that preceded
the collapse (from about 1993), the Bank of Thailand
began to tighten up interest rates. As could be
expected, the only impact this policy had was to
induce more money, mostly short-term, to flow in,
with the result that Thai companies became heavily
indebted in dollars. Worse, a substantial chunk of this
dollar debt was intermediated by Thai banks, who
borrowed short-term from foreign banks. By mid-
1995 total short-term external debt from the private
sector plus the annual current account deficit
exceeded the foreign exchange reserves of the Bank
of Thailand. After that it was a matter of time before
the speculators realised that the fixed exchange rate
regime was no longer tenable. In November 1996,
the first attack on the baht began, and after three
waves of attack, it was all over. The Bank of
Thailand’s net foreign exchange reserves were nearly
exhausted, and the baht was devalued.
Underlying all of these developments and which
propelled the economy towards ultimate collapse
was the weakness of the keystone institutions in the
Thai financial system, the commercial banks and
finance companies,2 and concomitantly, the
supervisory system of the central bank.
This article will examine the changes that occurred in
the Thai financial system since 1997, and evaluate the
performance of the economy that emerged.
Because the financial system and its supervision were
the central weakness and the focus of the post-crisis
reforms – at least until the appearance on the scene
of the Thaksin government, Section 2 dwells on the
system’s pre-crisis structure, which is followed by a
discussion, in Section 3, of the reforms that took
place. Section 4 looks at the expansion of the capital
market, which has partially taken over the role of the
banks as the source of funding for companies.
Section 5 comments on post-crisis monetary and
exchange rate policies and Section 6 concludes and
suggests where further reforms are needed.
2 The weakness of the pre-crisis financial
system
Before the crisis, 15 commercial banks dominated
the scene with about 100 finance companies
bringing up the rear.3 Flows of funds figures show
them to be able to obtain about 60 per cent of
household financial savings each year.4 These
household savings were essential to supplement the
capital needs of the rapidly growing incorporated
enterprises, because they plough back only one-third
of their incomes for investment. During the period
1993–6, these enterprises obtained a majority of
their outside funding through short-term and long-
term bank loans. Foreign saving of loans also
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provided a significant source of funds to the firms, as
well as indirectly through the banks (Table 1).
Given this pattern of the flow of funds, banks were
highly vulnerable due to the classic reason of
borrowing short and lending long. Thai banks,
however, have been performing this function for
decades, with relatively little mishap. In an earlier
period, at the time when Thailand was primarily an
agricultural exporter, banks were financing mostly
short-term needs of the traders, and the problem of
the maturity mismatch was not so severe. But as the
country industrialised, the mismatch problem
became severe, and during the bubble period, it was
compounded by currency mismatch, because banks
were intermediating by using dollars to finance many
firms which were engaged in non-tradable activities,
in particular, the property sector.5
The newly liberalised credit markets also
compounded a chronic weakness of the Thai banking
sector, which is its penchant for insider lending.
Banking families had traditionally used credit from
their banks to build up large business empires. To the
extent that these were investments in real assets,
and to the extent that the families had an interest in
making productive investments, the long-term
survival of this system was not threatened. The bank
rate of failures was kept at about one per decade.
But during the atmosphere bubble of 1993–6, with
unlimited money flowing in from overseas, a great
deal of the money was diverted by bankers and
borrowers to speculate in the property and stock
markets. The failure of the Bangkok Bank of
Commerce (BBC) in 1995 was a particularly notorious
example of the sort of malpractices by the new
breed of bankers.
The failure of the BBC also showed the weakness of
the Bank of Thailand’s supervision system. Aside from
the question of the personal integrity of the
personnel involved (a question that previously had
never been raised as far as the central bank was
concerned), there was also a structural problem with
the design of the supervision system, in which
forbearance was built in. The problems at the BBC
had been lingering for well over a decade before
they came to a head. Throughout, the central bank
had not only shown extraordinary forbearance, but
at various points had injected funds to shore it up,
using the Financial Institutional Development Fund
(FIDF) for the purpose. The FIDF was managed
jointly by the central bank and the Ministry of
Finance, with the bank having more de facto power.
Further, the fund was set up under the Bank of
Thailand Act and consequently, the paper would be
guaranteed by the central bank itself. Thus, it turns
out that the supervisory agency, i.e. the central bank,
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Table 1 Source of net fund flows for incorporated enterprises 1993–6 (%)
1993 1994 1995 1996
Liquid financial assets –21.5 –7.1 –6.0 –9.2
Short-term loans and bills 26.0 15.8 20.6 23.3
Trade credit –0.2 2.2 1.1 –0.9
Long-term loans 61.7 65.2 45.4 36.8
Mortgages 2.1 4.8 4.7 5.3
Debentures 4.0 9.2 4.7 0.6
Hire-purchase debts –13.3 –10.2 –8.5 –12.6
Foreign debts and claims 32.5 –13.8 20.2 38.6
Share capital 16.1 28.8 17.9 20.7
Others –7.2 5.1 –0.1 –2.6
Total net incurrence of liabilities 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source Author’s elaboration.
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had access to unlimited funds from the money
market to rescue itself from its own folly.
One should add at this point that throughout the
period until August 1997, Thailand never had a formal
system of deposit guarantee. However, the practice
of the central bank in the past in dealing with
problem banks had been to rescue them with zero
impact on depositors; in many cases the resources
for the rescue coming from FIDF.6
By the first half of 1997, the weakness of the
banking sector was becoming obvious. In March, ten
finance companies were told by the central bank to
increase their capital, followed a few months later
by the suspension of 16 finance companies (including
the first ten that were told to increase their capital).
In August 1997, 58 (out of some 91 remaining) more
were suspended, and in November, all but two of
these were closed down altogether. A few more
were closed in the following year. By the end of
1998, finance companies, whose deposits used to be
as much as one-third of the commercial banks’
funds, ceased to be a significant factor in the
financial system. The year 1998 also saw the
government’s takeover of a number of smaller
banks.
The collapse of the financial system was extremely
costly for the Thai treasury. Totalling 1.4 trillion baht
(the estimate being made as of May 2002), it
constituted about 30 per cent of the GNP that year.
Naturally, controversy surrounded the question of
whether the Thai government (then working under
an IMF programme) had taken the right course of
action on the problems of the financial institutions,
as well as on the method of disposal of their assets.
While this question may lend itself to forensic
investigations, a better question is to ask how to
prevent such a collapse from happening in the first
place, and if parts of the financial system had of
necessity to be excised, how could this be effectively
done?
3 A radically different banking system
Devastated by the crisis, the Thai banking system
emerged from it with slightly less than half of the
total deposits being in the state banks, much of it
taken over during the reorganisation of the crisis.
The surviving private banks realised that the old
business model that served it well in the pre-crisis
era was no longer viable, even in the long term.
In the short term – and it was a short term that
lasted almost six years – lenders and borrowers alike
were engaged in sweating out the overhang of debt
accumulated during the bubble. This process took
longer than was necessary. This is not surprising,
given that the assets classified as non-performing
touched 40 per cent for all banks at one point.
The two governments – Democrat (1997–2001) and
Thai Rak Thai (2001–7) – had different approaches on
the proper policies that the government should
follow in facilitating the workout. The Democrat
government relied on the reform of the bankruptcy
law which was meant to speed up the workout
process, which was itself left to the lenders and
borrowers to work out for themselves. The Thai Rak
Thai government decided to buy out the bad assets
from the existing banks (except those that were
already in the judicial process) and place them in the
Thai Asset Management Corporation (TAMC), who
would then oversee the workout, with the losses
being shared between the lenders and the
government. A point worth noting is that well over
four-fifths of the acquired assets were from state
banks.
Of course, the non-judicial arrangement of TAMC
could easily lead to corruption. Thus far, no such
charge has been made, which is not surprising as the
procedures used have been singularly opaque, and
very little information seems to have been supplied
about the outcomes of its asset management.
As far as the long-term strategy is concerned, private
banks are now extremely wary about lending to large
businesses, although they have been expanding other
fee-based services to those customers, such as cash
management. They have been turning to consumer
banking and have expanded businesses such as credit
cards and mortgages. In this they have been following
the trend of banking worldwide (Ghosh 2006).
Households are themselves increasingly moving away
from banks towards shares and only 20–40 per cent
of their financial savings are in the banks, as
contrasted to over 60 per cent before the crisis, with
much of the remainder going into share capital,
mutual funds and government bonds.
Apart from these shifts by both savers and investors,
banks are now also subject to much more stringent
supervision. In particular, the definition of non-
performing loans has been tightened up considerably.
‘Evergreen’ loans could no longer pass the central
bank’s audit. These changes have made lending
transactions to businesses considerably less attractive.
From being an essential cog in the transfer from
saving to investment, the banks’ role in this
intermediation has become increasingly peripheral,
with the capital market taking up much of the
decline. Nevertheless, it cannot be said the latter has
completely taken over the role of the banks. Two
observations will bear this out:
1 The investment/GDP ration is still in the mid-
20 per cent range, after being consistently in the
30 plus range in the early 1990s and even before
the bubble.
2 Banks have been having excess liquidity since 1999,
and have not been able to unload this liquidity to
good borrowers.
4 The expansion of the capital market
As banks have withdrawn from supplying capital to
large firms, the latter have mostly turned to the
capital markets to issue debentures and some share
capital. The amounts raised by these means each year
easily exceeded the increase in bank credit. For
example, in 2006, credits from banks increased by
426.0 billion baht, while newly issued domestic
securities from private corporations were as high as
852.7 million baht.
There are two additional observations that need to
be made:
1 The capital market is still the preserve of large
corporations, with small firms being effectively
excluded. Although it needs to be added that
Thailand has an active bill-of-exchange market of
an unknown size, which appears to fill the needs
of at least medium-sized firms.
2 During the post-crisis period, firms have been
actively using their cash flow both to run-down
their debts, and to make new investments. This
has been the pattern in the past after every
economic downturn.
5 Monetary and exchange rate policies
After the violent gyrations brought on by the crisis in
1997–8, the economy began to stabilise, albeit at a
low level which persisted for a long period. With
prices relatively stable, despite a drastic devaluation of
the baht, the Bank of Thailand felt confident enough
to shift its policy regime to inflation targeting, while
retaining a (mostly) flexible exchange rate regime.
Having swung violently from a current account deficit
of 8 per cent to a surplus of 12 per cent within three
months, Thailand saw continual surpluses as it worked
off its debt over the next seven years, while the baht
slowly appreciated along with other Asian currencies
until the last quarter of 2006.
Unfortunately, being a cleaner floater than the rest
of Asia has its price. During the last quarter of 2006,
as the betting in the currency markets was that the
dollar would weaken, speculators found that pouring
money into the baht (as against, say, the renminbi)
was quite profitable, because the baht, being more
flexible, appreciated more strongly than other Asian
currencies, excluding the Philippine peso and the
Indonesian rupiah.
There was also a problem with the baht in that its
interest rate was somewhat higher than its
neighbours. The Monetary Policy Committee held
firm against lowering interest rates because it was
tethered to its inflation target. Perceiving that the
rapid ascent of the baht was destabilising the
country’s trade, and reluctant to expand the remit of
its inflation targeting regime, the Bank of Thailand
decided to control the inward flow of capital by
using the Chilean device of requiring uncompensated
reserves of 30 per cent on most transactions,
including the use of non-resident baht accounts to
purchase stocks and other debt instruments. Coming
out of the blue, this played havoc with the stock
market, which saw its index decline by 15 per cent in
one day. The control measure has been softened
somewhat, but foreign confidence has been severely
affected, at least temporarily.
6 Unfinished business
There have been two positive policy developments
since the crisis, but one of these is as yet incomplete,
and the other remains untested under trying
conditions.
The incomplete policy pertains to the question of
ensuring the stability of the financial institutions. Much
has been achieved in improving the quality of the
supervision of the central bank. Both the central bank
and the banks themselves have taken on board the
idea that the central task in dealing with financial
institutions is risk management. Unfortunately, while
individual (private) banks have become more adept at
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this task, the policy framework has two very large
gaps. One is the very large share of state banks in the
industry. The risk posed by state banks is that despite
the lessons learnt during the crisis, they still lend to
politically connected individuals. Until these banks are
privatised, risks with these banks will remain. The
other gap is the blanket deposit guarantee adopted
during the crisis in August 1997. This needs to be
reformed, and at a time when there is not much risk
of a run (such as now).
The untested policy is the inflation-targeting regime
which the bank has adopted. Ever since its
introduction, the stress from the demand side on
inflation has been small. How the regime will survive
under red-hot conditions, such as those that occurred
during 1993–6, remains untested. One small problem
is that the central bank is not legally independent. It is
a small problem, because in the past, the central bank
as an institution has enjoyed the trust and support of
the population to a remarkable extent. That trust and
support declined sharply during the period leading up
to and immediately after the crisis of 1997. However,
since then the bank has substantially recovered much
of its lost prestige. Nevertheless, it has to be kept in
mind that, even after the crisis, one of the governors
was sacked. Indeed, the number of governors being
sacked has become more frequent. It remains to be
seen how it will fare when it becomes necessary ‘to
take away the punch bowl just as the party gets
going’, as an American central banker once remarked.
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Notes
1 For a more extensive account of the events that
led to the 2nd of July 1997 debacle, see
Siamwalla et al. (2003).
2 Finance companies are near-banks that can
accept deposits from the general public (there is a
minimum amount to be deposited). The main
difference is that they cannot issue cheques and
therefore play no role in the payment system.
3 Bank deposits were about three-quarters of the
deposits of both types of institutions.
4 ‘Household’ in Thai financial accounts includes
unincorporated enterprises.
5 Because the central bank required banks to
balance their foreign exchange assets and
liabilities with the maximum imbalance permitted
being 20 per cent of first tier capital, it would
appear that banks should not have a severe
problem of currency mismatch. Although the
currency risk may have been minimised, given the
activities of their customers, that risk may have
been replaced by credit risk. For a further
discussion on this point, see the final article by
Griffith-Jones and Gottschalk in this IDS Bulletin.
6 Finance companies were allowed to fold with
depositors taking a partial hit. The reason for the
differential treatment was that banks are part of
the payments system, whereas finance companies
are not.
